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Models of Incentive Contracts for Just-In-Time Delivery 
Abstract 
This paper considers how to structure contractual incentives between a buyer and 
a single supplier of raw materials when early shipments are forbidden. A leader-follower 
game is used to take the supplier's behavior into account in the buyer's choice of incentives. 
Combinations of two types of incentives that the buyer might offer are considered: (1) a 
fixed-value, ali-or-nothing incentive and (2) an incentive that decreases in value as time 
elapses. Given a desired probability of on-time delivery, optimal incentives are found by 
specifying indifference curves for on-time delivery and assessing the expected total cost of 
incentive schemes along that curve. Difficulties of using incentives to achieve 100% on-time 
delivery are considered and three example flow time distributions are presented. 
1. Introduction 
Just-in-time (JIT) purchasing involves eliminating waste in the linkages between a 
firm and its suppliers. Usually, the procedure for eliminating waste includes reducing the 
amount of in-bound material held by the firm, and reducing the lot size of deliveries. 
This reduction in inventory and lot size requires streamlined material handling, reduction 
or elimination of incoming inspection, and more effective communication of requirements 
between buyer and supplier. A more complete description of JIT purchasing has been 
provided elsewhere [1,2,3, and 4]. 
Although the benefits achieved in the ideal scenario seem promising, JIT purchasing 
has proven to be difficult to implement. Research shows that a substantial portion of 
buyers experience problems implementing JIT purchasing. Lack of support [5], vendor 
related work stoppages [6,7], suppliers holding excessive inventory to ensure timely delivery 
[8,9,10] are some of the problems that are reported. 
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One of the reasons that JIT purchasing is difficult to implement is that timing is 
extremely critical to a buyer's ongoing economical operation; yet the supplier controls 
the timeliness of the deliveries. In JIT purchasing buyers depend on their suppliers to 
provide inputs to their production process on a very strict time schedule. Because little 
or no excess inventory is kept to compensate for supply uncertainties, tardy deliveries 
cause costly work stoppages. In order to avoid these stoppages, firms implementing JIT 
purchasing must create buyer-supplier relationships that insure that deliveries are as timely 
as possible. 
Not all managers are comfortable with the supplier dependence that JIT purchasing 
creates. Timeliness is costly to the supplier; the supplier must exert effort and dedicate 
resources to insure that deliveries occur on time. Managers may be skeptical that the 
supplier is willing to exert the level of effort desired by the buyer. Spekman [11] described 
this uneasy dependence as "strategic vulnerability," the risk associated with acting as if 
firms are vertically integrated when they are not. A buyer's strategic vulnerability is the 
result of the buyer having more limited means of controlling the supplier's behavior than 
under vertical integration. Reducing strategic vulnerability involves providing managers 
with improved methods of influencing the behavior of suppliers. 
A variety of methods for influencing supplier behavior are available. Historically, most 
U.S. firms have used competitive pressure to influence suppliers. Buyers have allocated 
portions of their purchases of an item to multiple suppliers. The timeliness, quality, and 
price of the suppliers are used to determine what proportion of the purchases are allocated 
to each supplier. Asanuma [12] and MacMillan [13] describe the intricate competitive struc-
ture of buyer-supplier relationships used by large Japanese firms to maintain competitive 
pressure during the execution of long-term contracts. Johnston and Lawrence [14] discuss 
the use of reciprocity as a means of controlling the behavior of suppliers. Their work is an 
application of Axelrod's research into the prisoner's dilemma game [15]. Axelrod finds that 
the "tit-for-tat" strategy is an effective, robust strategy for creating cooperation. Supplier 
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behavior can also be controlled through contractual means. Williamson [16) suggests the 
creation of "self-enforcing" contracts through the use of "hostages." A hostage is some-
thing of value that is held by the buyer to insure that the supplier performs according 
to the contract. The contract is self-enforcing in the sense that if the supplier fails to 
perform, the buyer keeps the hostage as a remedy for the breach of contract. A similar 
approach is used by Crocker and Masten [17). Another model of contractual control is the 
principal-agent problem. In the principal-agent problem, incentives are created to make 
the actions that are desired by the buyer be in the interest of the supplier [18). In actual 
practice, nearly 50% of JIT purchasing contracts use penalties for non-performance as an 
incentive for on-time delivery [6]. Such incentive schemes have been formulate as a sequen-
tial game to determine the buyer's least-cost incentives and the supplier's cost-minimizing 
response to those incentives for two specific flow time distributions [19]. This paper also 
uses a sequential game to model delivery incentives. However, the results of this research 
are more general because the results characterize the buyer's decision for any flow time 
distribution. 
2. Contractual incentives 
This paper focuses on achieving on-time deliveries in JIT purchasing using contractual 
incentives. Two types of incentives are considered: {1) a fixed-value, ali-or-nothing incen-
tive and {2) an incentive that declines over time. Contractual incentives for on-time deliv-
ery can be provided as either bonuses for performance or penalties for non-performance. 
Mathematically, the distinction between bonuses and penalties is inconsequential. If the 
price specified in the contract includes a premium that is forfeited for late delivery, then 
a penalty is being used. If the contract price is augmented by a premium for on-time 
delivery, then a bonus is used. The exchange is not affected by how the incentives are 
labelled. 
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For simplicity of exposition, the fixed-value, all-or-nothing incentive is called a bonus 
(B). The buyer pays this bonus to the supplier for each on-time delivery that occurs under 
the contract. The supplier receives either the entire bonus B or no bonus for each delivery. 
The incentive that is proportional to the amount of time that a delivery is late is called 
a penalty (P). When 8. penalty is used, the buyer withholds P for each unit of time that 
the delivery was late. By using the bonus and penalty together, any incentive scheme that 
is a linear function of time can be created. 
In this paper, both B and P are assumed to be non-negative. The buyer and supplier 
are assumed to be rational and only enter into contracts that are financially beneficial. 
The supplier only enters contracts where the expected revenue is at least equal to some 
minimum "reservation price." The reservation price is the lowest expected revenue where 
the supplier is still willing to trade with the buyer. If the amount that the supplier expects 
to receive is less than the reservation price, the supplier will choose not to sell to the 
buyer. A more reliable, timely supplier can expect to be paid more than a less reliable, 
less timely supplier. The extra revenue that the more timely supplier receives will be called 
a timeliness premium. This timeliness premium becomes larger as the tardiness of orders 
and the proportion of orders tardy decreases. The buyer does not enter a contract when 
a more attractive alternative exists. If the expected cost of incentives to achieve a given 
service level exceed the cost of holding inventory then incentives will not be used. The 
supplier's requirement of earning the reservation price is modelled explicitly. The buyer's 
option to hold inventory instead of offering incentives is not included in the model. The 
omission is not intended to imply that this option is not a valid respons to buyer-supplier 
interaction; rather, the omission reflects the focus of this paper on the incentive schemes 
that are included in signed contracts. 
A very stylized just-in-time environment is assumed. A kanban ordering system is 
used. The order size is constant and known. Early shipments are forbidden. The buyer 
follows the JIT practice of freezing its production schedule and requirementswell in advance 
5 
of actual production. A long-term contract for an item is signed with a single make-to-order 
supplier. Multiple orders and deliveries occur under the contract. The long-term contract 
includes incentives for on-time delivery. The incentives are awarded after each delivery 
based on the timeliness of that delivery. The more closely the actual situation matches 
these stylized assumptions the more accurately the model indicates optimal behavior. 
In selecting an incentive, the buyer must take into account how the supplier will 
respond. The supplier can respond to incentives by holding additional inventory or by 
reducing the variance of flow time. Holding additional inventory makes on-time deliveries 
more likely. Inventory is increased in a make-to-order operation by increasing the flow 
time allowance, that is, by increasing the amount of time budgeted for completing the 
buyer's order. Since early shipments are forbidden, increasing the flow time allowance 
causes the average order to be held longer in inventory prior to shipment. This response 
is not the most desirable one according to JIT proponents. A reduction in the variance of 
flow time through the implementation of JIT is preferred. In this case, both the allowance 
and the variance can be controlled to increase the probability of on-time delivery. Grout 
and Christy [20] present a model where the optimal allowance and variance are determined 
for uniformly distributed flow times. 
Developing general results when the variance is controlled by the supplier is difficult 
because including the variance of flow time as a decision variable requires that the prob-
ability density function of flow time be specified. In this paper, only controlling the flow 
time allowance is considered. The results provided do not require that a flow time distribu-
tion be specified. However, this means that the results are a worst case scenario, since the 
response to incentives may be understated for suppliers that choose to reduce the variance 




The method of analysis used in this paper is similar to the analysis used to characterize 
utility maximization. Sets made up of varying amounts of goods that provide the same 
level of satisfaction are called indifference curves. Consumers have a budget constraint that 
insures that the sum of the quantity times the price for the various goods they purchase 
do not exceed the money they have to spend. Utility is maximized by choosing a set of 
goods from the most preferred indifference curve. This curve typically is tangent to the 
budget constraint. 
In this paper, bonuses and penalties can be combined at varying levels of B and P 
to achieve a specific probability of on-time delivery. The set of (B, P) pairs that provide 
a given probability of on-time delivery can be plotted to create a curve. This curve corre-
sponds to the notion of an indifference curve in economics. These lines of equal probability 
of on-time delivery are considered instead of lines of equal satisfaction. This analysis dif-
fers from the economic analysis of utility maximization because no budget constraint is 
identified. Rather, a given probability of on-time delivery is selected, and a minimum cost 
incentive scheme to achieve that probability is found. 
The reason that a more straightforward optimization technique is not used is because 
it would require that a specific probability density function of flow time be specified. This 
would make any results about the use of penalties and bonuses valid only for specific 
distributions. 
In the analysis, the supplier's minimum cost is found using calculus. The result 1s 
essentially that of the newsvendor problem, but finding the optimal allowance here 1s 
not possible without specifying the probability density function of flow time. However, 
the bonus or penalty required to achieve a given probability of on-time delivery can be 
characterized. This information is used to create the expression of the buyer's cost that 
always has the same probability of on-time delivery, without specifying the probability 
density function. 
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4. The model 
The majority of cost parameters used in modeling delivery behavior are those which 
are commonly used in inventory theory. The definitions of cost parameters vary slightly 
from one inventory researcher to another, so the cost parameters that are used are defined 
below. 
4.1. Buyer and .mpplier coJtJ 
The supplier faces two relevant costs. The cost of finishing the order early, and the 
cost of finishing the order late. When early shipments are forbidden, the cost of finishing 
early is the cost associated with holding the order as finished goods inventory until the 
delivery due date. The holding cost rate a is assumed to be positive, based upon a fixed 
order size, and computed for the time items are held as finished goods only. A fixed 
order size is assumed to avoid unnecessary complications, and Grout [21] shows that order 
size does not affect the delivery incentive problem. Only finished goods holding costs are 
considered, work-in-process holding costs are assumed to be unaffected by the prohibition 
of early shipment. These holding costs are reduced by bonus payments by the buyer when 
deliveries occur on-time. The buyer pays the supplier a bonus of B only when delivery 
occurs on the due date. When shipments arrive late the bonus is not paid. 
The cost of finishing an order late involves two components: the cost of tardiness, 
and the cost of penalties levied by the buyer. Both costs are assumed to be positive 
and proportional to the amount of time that the order is tardy. The tardiness cost per 
unit of time is /3. This cost does not include estimated costs of lost goodwill ru1d buyer 
inconvenience like stockout costs in traditional inventory theory. Rather, the tardiness 
cost includes only the costs of the status tracking, rescheduling, and communication with 
the buyer associated with not meeting the due date. The cost of lost goodwill and buyer 
inconvenience are presumed to be incorporated into the buyer's choice of penalty P. The 
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parameter {3 is assumed to be a constant. The per- unit-time penalty P is a decision 
variable that is assumed to be controlled by the buyer. 
The buyer's cost is the contract price C plus the marginal cost of incentives, or time-
liness premium. The supplier is assumed to require a reward for increased timeliness. The 
timeliness premium is assumed to increase as the probability of on-time delivery increases. 
Without this assumption the buyer could achieve a higher probability of on-time delivery 
and still pay only the reservation price by manipulating the incentives and the contract 
price of the goods. The relationship of the bonus, penalty, contract price, and reservation 
price is presented in detail later in this paper. 
Another cost to the buyer is the cost of stock outs when deliveries are late. This 
cost decreases as timeliness increases. Were this cost zero or negative, there would not be 
a timeliness problem. The stock out cost is relevant in choosing the optimal probability 
of on-time delivery; however, in this analysis, choosing the best probability of on-time 
delivery is not addressed. Rather, once management has selected a desired probability, 
this analysis indicates the minimum cost incentive scheme to achieve it. 
The following notation is be used: 
X,(A) = supplier's expected total relevant cost as a function of the allowance 
Xb(B, P) = buyer's expected total relevant cost as a function of the bonus and penalty 
a = holding cost per order per period of time 
(3 = tardy cost per order per period of time 
A = the allowance, the time budgeted for the completion of the order 
Ao = the baseline allowance, the time budgeted for the completion of the order when 
no incentives are offered 
F = the flow time, the random variable of how long it actually takes to complete the 
order 
g(F) = the probability density function of the flow time 
G(A) = The cumulative distribution function of the flow time distribution at A 
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C = the contract price, the price paid per order as specified in the contract regardless 
of when it is delivered 
R = the reservation price, the minimum expected revenue where the supplier is willing 
to trade with the buyer. 
The amount of time finished goods are held can be expressed as 
{ 0, if A$ F; A-F, ifA>F. 
The · amount of time orders are tardy is 
4. 2. The supplier's cost function 
{ F0 - A if A < F; if A 2:: F. 
The supplier's expected cost as a function of the allowance Xa(A) can now be stated: 
X 8 (A) = a · foA (A- F)· g(F)dF+(f3+P)· Loo (F-A)· g(F)dF-B·lA g(F)dF. (1) 
The first term is the expected holding cost, the second term is the expected tardy and 
penalty costs, and the third term is the expected bonus that is received. 
Leibniz's rule is applied to X a( A) to find the first derivative with respect to A. The 
minimum cost is achieved by selecting an allowance that satisfies the following equation: 
{3+P B {3 p + {3 p · g(A) = G(A). 
a+ + a+ + . 
(2) 
If the contract does not use incentives, in which case P = 0 and B = 0, then (2) is the 





The expected cost of setting the allowance too long must be balanced with the expected 
cost of setting the allowance too short. In JIT purchasing, the cost of setting the allowance 
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too long is the holding cost (a) of orders that cannot be shipped until the due date. The 
cost of setting the allowance too short is the tardiness cost (/3) that is incurred when orders 
are not delivered on-time. 
This case, where incentives are not used, provides a baseline for the probability of 
on-time delivery and the cost of incentives to achieve more timely delivery. The allowance 
that satisfies (3) is A0 • 
Suppose that the buyer wanted to achieve a particular probability of on-time delivery 
G(A) = k. By substituting k for G(A) in (2), a manager can solve for either the bonus Bk 
or penalty Pk necessary to achieve k, or 
B _ ka-(1-k)(f3+P) 
k- g(A) ' 




Either of these equations can be used to plot the line of equal probability of on-time 
delivery for various combinations of B and P. Figure 1 shows a curve for a uniform 
distribution. The negative slope of these lines is expected since increasing P in ( 4) results 
in smaller values of Bk. The horizontal line at 100% probability of on-time delivery is also 
expected. When deliveries are always on-time, the supplier is never charged the penalty. 
Since the penalty is not incurred, the value of P is irrelevant when the probability of on-
time delivery is 100%. The uniform distribution has special properties that make 100% 
on-time delivery possible. For other distributions, 100% on-time delivery may not be 
achievable. 
- insert Figure 1 about here -
4. 9. Difficulty achieving 100 percent on-time delivery 
Equations Bk and Pk provide new insight into the task of achieving 100% on-time 
delivery. There are at least three conditions that make 100% on-time delivery impossible: 
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(1) a flow time distribution with infinitely long upper tail, (2) using only per-time-period 
incentives, and (3) a flow time distribution that ends at zero. 
Failure to achieve 100% on-time delivery could be the result of having a flow time 
distribution that has an infinitely long upper tail. Because the tail is infinitely long, any 
finite allowance selected by the supplier will result in less than 100% on-time delivery. 
The second condition that would make 100% on-time delivery impossible is the use 
of only a per-time-period incentive like the penalty P. Even if the flow time distribution 
has finite tails and Pis very large, 100% on-time delivery will not occur. Penalties alone 
cannot be used to achieve 100% on-time delivery since the equation for Pk, (5), is undefined 
when k = 1. The supplier's optimal probability of on-time delivery is less than one any 
time that B = 0 and o is positive: 
f3 + p = G(A). 
o+f3+P 
(6) 
The third condition that would make 100% on-time delivery impossible is that the 
tails of the finite distribution of flow time occur where the probability density function 
takes on the value zero. \Vhen k = 1, 
(7) 
If the probability density function g(A) equals zero at the upper bound of the distribution 
then Bk is undefined. Consider an example using the triangular distribution. Let a, b, 
and c represent the lower bound, mode, and upper bound of a triangular distribution 
respectively. The probability density function for points above the mode is 
When k = 1, 
2(c- A) 
g(A)= (c-b)(c-a)' 
Bk = ~ = o(c - b)(c - a). 




One hundred percent on-time delivery implies that the flow time allowance equals the upper 
bound of the distribution, A = c; therefore, B,. is undefined. As k increases approaching 
1, B,. increases toward infinity. 
Now consider the case where none of these three conditions hold. In order to achieve 
100% on-time delivery, a fixed-value incentive like the bonus B must be used and the flow 
time distribution of the supplier must be finite and end with a "step" (g(A) > 0 when 
k = 1). 
The three conditions discussed imply that 100% on-time delivery may not be a realistic 
aspiration in every delivery situations. The purpose of this paper is to provide insights into 
achieving timeliness, not to discourage such achievements. This discussion of the difficulties 
of achieving 100% on-time delivery is intended to identify the limitation of using incentive 
schemes with cost minimizing suppliers. 
4.4. The buyer's cost function 
In order to determine an optimal incentive scheme for on-time delivery, the buyer's 
cost of choosing a given scheme must be found. The buyer's cost function depends on B 
and P. It is clear that any bonus the buyer pays the supplier increases the buyer's costs. 
It is not as apparent that charging the supplier a penalty costs the buyer more. The-use 
of penalties reduce the supplier's profit. If the penalty is large enough to reduce profits 
below an acceptable level, the supplier will do business elsewhere. The supplier only enters 
into contracts that do not have excessive penalties. If the buyer has been buying the item 
for the lowest possible price (the reservation price), any penalty that is included in the 
contract must be offset by an increase in price to compensate for the expected value of the 
penalty. This logic can be expressed as follows: 
l Ao 1oo C +B · g(F)dF- P · (F- A 0 ) • g(F)dF = R. 
0 Ao 
(10) 
Equation (10) insures that if the supplier's delivery timeliness remains unchanged 
when incentives are used, then the supplier still receives the reservation price. Recall that 
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A0 is the allowance when no incentives are offered. Rearranging terms yields 
l Ao 1oo C = R- B · g(F)dF + P · (F- Ao) · g(F)dF. 
0 Ao 
(11) 
The buyer's expected relevant cost Xb(B, P) is 
Xb(B, P) = C + B ·1A g(F)dF- P • Loo (F-A)· g(F)dF. (12) 
or, substituting (11) for C, 
Xb(B,P) = R + B · L: g(F)dF + P [L~ (F- Ao) · g(F)dF- Loo (F-A)· g(F)dF]. 
(13) 
The second term is the expected bonus payments that the buyer gives to the supplier 
for more timely deliveries. The third term is the expected marginal cost of imposing a 
penalty for late deliveries. The sum of these two terms is the timeliness premiwn discussed 
above. 
The buyer wants to minimize Xb(B, P). To do so using calculus requires that g(F) 
be specified so that A can be stated as a function of Band P. For a particular probability 
density function, these steps are not conceptually difficult (although some distributions are 
computationally tedious). An example for the uniform and exponential distributions using 
a similar cost function where only B is used is given by Grout and Christy [19]. Insights 
that are true regardless of the flow time distribution are provided here. Consequently, 
minimizing Xb(B, P) is accomplished by using an economic indifference curve approach to 
.avoid specifying g(F). 
Suppose that the desired probability of on-time delivery is k. Equations (4) or (5) can 
be used to determine the bonus or penalty required to achieve k. Let B in equation (13) 
be Bk as shown in (4). Then Xb(B,P) can be restated as follows: 
X (P k) =R ka:- (1 - k)(/3 + P) ·1A (F)dF 
b ' + (A) g + 9 Ao 
P [i~ (F- Ao) · g(F)dF- Loo (F-A)· g(F)dF]. 
(14) 
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Note that this equation is now a function of P and k. For a specific value of k, as 
P varies B changes so that the probability of on-time delivery is maintained at k. Also 
notice that maintaining the same probability of on-time delivery implies that the allowance 
A remains constant asP varies. Equation (14) is the buyer's expected cost function along 
a line of equal probability of on-time delivery. Minimizing this function with respect toP 
indicates the optimal incentive scheme. Taking the first derivative of (14) yields 
ax~c;' k) = roo (F- Ao). g(F)dF- roo (F ~A)· g(F)dF- (1 Ct~) · {A g(F)dF. (15) lAo }A 9 lAo 
An important feature of this result is that it does not contain P. Equation (13) is 
linear in P. The implication of this is that the lines of equal probability of on-time delivery 
are straight lines. Thus, the typical solution to the economic version of the problem, a 
point of tangency, does not hold for this delivery incentive problem. Rather, the solution 
is a corner point. Either B ~ 0 and P = 0, orB= 0 and P ~ 0 is optimal. Using both 
incentives, B > 0 and P > 0, is optimal only in the alternate optima case. When this 
occurs, any combination of incentives on the line of equal probability results in the same 
expected cost to the buyer. 
Which type of incentive should be used? In a specific instance where it is appropriate 
to seek 100% on-time delivery, then a bonus must be used; costs are minimized by using 
a bonus exclusively. This bonus can be found using equation (4) by setting k = 1, and 
P = 0. Since 100% on-time delivery may be very costly or impossible, firms may choose a 
probability that is less than 100%. If a probability that is less than 100% is selected, then 
the choice between penalties and bonuses is not as obvious. If equation (15) is negative 
then the expected relevant cost is a minimum when B = 0 and P ~ 0; P should be used 
exclusively. If equation (15) is positive, then the minimum occurs where P = 0 and B ~ 0; 
the optimal action is to use only B to achieve k. An alternative calculation to determine 
which incentive to select is to compute the expected cost of each incentive assuming that 
the other is zero. Determining whether to use B > 0 or P > 0 and then finding the 
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necessary value of B or P using (4) or (5) to achieve the probability of on-time delivery k 
constitutes an optimal solution to the delivery problem. 
5. Example distributions 
In this section, three examples are presented. In each example, the decision between 
a bonus and penalty is shown. For a specific instance where all the data is known, this 
decision is relatively straightforward. The examples attempt to determine which incentive 
to use by considering only the type of distribution. General statements about exponential 
and uniform distributions can be made. The triangular distribution provides an example 
where no definitive conclusion is reached without more information. Two methods of com-
paring the incentives are available. The first method uses equation (13) with P = 0, B ;::: 0 
and P ;::: 0, B = 0 to directly compare the cost of the incentive schemes. The second 
method uses equation (15) to determine how cost changes asP changes. In developing the 
examples, both methods were used. For the exponential and uniform distributions, con-
clusions made by direct comparison using (13) are more easily proven. For the triangular 
distribution, the results using (13) are more compact. 
5.1. Uniformly distributed flow time 
In order to determine which incentive to use, the allowance A must be specified as 
a function of k. Do this by setting the cumulative distribution function equal to k and 
solving for A. For the uniform distribution, A = l + k( u - l), where ( u, l) are the upper 
and lower bounds of the distribution. The value of Ao is found by setting k = ~ in the 
equation for A. For the uniform distribution Ao = I+~ ( u -l). When B > 0 and P = 0, 
equation (13) can be stated as 
X (B 0) = R (u -l)[k(a + ,8)- ,8]2 
B ' + a+,B (16) 
When B = 0 and P > 0, equation (13) is 
X (O P) = R [k(a + ,8)- ,8]2 · [- 2a- ,8 + k(a + ,B)](u - l) 
B ' + 2(a+,8)2(k-1) · (17) 
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X (0 P) - X (B 0) = [k( a+ /3) - /3]3( u - I) 
B ' B ' 2(a+/3)2 (1-k) . (18) 
The denominator of (18) is positive when k < 1. If [k(a + /3)- /3] 2:: 0, the numerator is 
non-negative. If k = m, then 
[k(a + /3)- /3] = 0. (19) 
If k = m + f where 0 < f =::;; o~fl' then 
ak- (1- k)/3 =(a+ f3)e. (20) 
For a > 0, and /3 > 0, (20) must be positive. When k = 1, ak > 0. The numerator is 
non-negative for relevant values of k. Therefore, the minimum cost incentive scheme is 
P = 0 and B 2:: 0. The buyer should use (4) to select the appropriate bonus Bk. 
5.2. Exponentially distributed flow time 
Consider exponentially distributed flow times with parameter .A. For this distribution 
A= iin(1- k) and Ao = iln(1- 0 ! 11 ). Comparing P = 0, B 2:: 0 and P 2:: 0, B = 0 
using equation (13) yields 
[-/3 + k( a+ /3)]2 
(a+ /3)(1- k).A (21) 
Equation (21) simplifies to zero. Therefore, the cost of an incentive scheme to achieve a 
given probability of on-time delivery is equal using either a bonus or a penalty. The buyer 
can choose either type of incentive scheme. The buyer can use either the equation for Bk 
as stated in (4) or for Pk as stated in (5) to find the appropriate incentive to achieve the 
desired probability of on-time delivery. 
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5.9. Triangular flow time distribution 
Consider a triangular distribution with parameters (a, b, c) indicating the lower bound, 
the mode, and the upper bound of the distribution respectively. For simplicity, the al-
lowance is assumed to exceed the mode, A ~ b. In other words, the most likely flow time 
to occur results in on-time delivery. For this distribution, 
and 
A= c- J(l- k)(c- b)(c- a) 
Ao = c- a( a- c)(b- c) 
a+f3 
The probability density function is 
g(F) = 2(c- f) 
(c- a)(c- b) 
The difference between the expected cost of using a bonus and a penalty is 




[ a( a- c)(b- c)~ _ [(c _ a)(c _ b)( 1 _ k)]~] ak- (1- k)f3 _ 
a+f3 . 3(c-a)(c-b)(1-k) (25} 
(c- a)(c- b)(ak- (1- k)f3)2 
2(a + f3)J(c- a)(c- b)(1- k) 
When k = -ofp, XB(O, P)- XB(B, 0) = 0. When k > -ofp, determining the sign of (25) 
is more difficult. In order for a penalty to be preferred, equation (25) must be negative. 
This would require that f3 be much larger than a. However, as {3 gets larger so does~' 
the minimum reasonable value for k. Because of this relationship among the variables, no 
instances of negative values of (25) were found in numerical examples using different ratios 
of a and {3. This suggests that the use of a bonus may be preferred to a penalty. For a 
specific instance, the optimal incentive can be determined using equation (25) to select the 
type of incentive and using equations (4) or (5) to determine the value of that incentive. 
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In summary, the determination of which incentive to use is considered in three exam-
ples. The actual determination of the value of the incentive is not presented explicitly. In 
order to actually determine the type and value of incentive to use, the buyer must know 
the supplier's holding cost, shortage cost, and flow time distribution. The model presented 
here assumes the buyer has this knowledge. If this assumption holds, the model gives 
managers a tool for selecting an approximately correct incentive scheme. The model may 
not be exactly correct because the supplier may not respond optimally to the incentives 
offered. The supplier may also choose to reduce the variance of flow time resulting in de-
liveries that are more timely than expected. Assuming that the buyer knows the supplier's 
costs is not uncommon in related research ((22,23] for instance). Determining how to cope 
with asymmetric information would be a worthwhile topic for further research. 
6. Conclusions 
Since as many as half of JIT contracts involve incentives, it is appropriate to consider 
how these incentives should be selected. Two types of incentives are considered here: a 
fixed-value, ali-or-nothing incentive that is called a bonus and a per-time-period incentive 
that is called a penalty. Equations that can be used to calculate the value of the bonus 
or penalty required to achieve a given probability of on-time delivery are presented. An 
equation describing the indifference point between using a bonus and a penalty is also 
provided. The ability to determine which type of incentive results in the least cost and 
the value of that type of incentive constitute the optimal method of achieving a given 
probability of on-time delivery. 
The result of this research is that under stylized conditions of JIT purchasing, the op-
timal method is that either a fixed-value, ali-or-nothing bonus or a per-time-period penalty 
should be used but not a combination of of the two. Three flow time distributions are pre-
sented as examples of determining which type of incentive to use. Given that combinations 
are not optimal, the determination can be made by directly comparing the costs of using 
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only a bonus with that of using only a penalty. Another method of determining which 
incentive to use is by finding the slope of the expected cost of achieving a given probability 
of on-time delivery. For uniformly distributed flow times, a bonus is shown to be preferred 
to a penalty. For exponentially distributed flow times, the buyer is indifferent to the type 
of incentive scheme used. Either a bonus or a penalty selected to achieve a specific prob-
ability of on-time delivery will result in the same cost. When the flow time distribution is 
triangular, with the allowance greater than the mode, no definitive conclusion was shown. 
However, of the specific instances of triangular distributions that were considered, all re-
sulted in the bonus being selected. An example where a penalty is strictly preferred would 
be of interest. Finding such an example is a matter for future research. 
Once the buyer reduces raw material inventories to very low levels, the buyer depends 
heavily on the timeliness of deliveries from the supplier to allow on-going economical pro-
duction. In such a scenario, managers may attempt to achieve 100% on-time delivery. 
This research indicates that some of these attempts may be futile. Three conditions nec-
essary for achieving 100% on-time delivery are delineated. One hundred percent on-time 
delivery is only achievable if a bonus is used, the flow time distribution is finite, and the 
flow time distribution ends with a "step." These three conditions, particularly the last, 
suggest that many of the distributions that would typically be used to characterize flow 
time would make 100% on-time delivery unattainable. The uniform distribution is an ex-
ample of a flow time distributions that meets all three conditions. This difficulty achieving 
100% on-time delivery indicates some of the limitations of using incentive schemes. Even 
when 100% on-time delivery is not possible, the model can be useful in improving supplier 
delivery timeliness. 
The results presented here suggest a variety of directions for further research. Chang-
ing the flow time allowance is not the preferred response to requests for JIT delivery. 
Further research could be conducted to determine a means of selecting incentives when 
the supplier can choose to reduce the variance of flow time. If the supplier reduces the 
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variance as incentives increase, the buyer should be able to achieve the same probability 
of on-time delivery with less cost. Making general statements about variance reduction is 
difficult using the type of model presented here because the distribution of flow time must 
be specified. Also note that all of the results presented in this paper are for a given proba-
bility of on-time delivery. Additional research could address how to select the probability 
of on-time delivery that minimizes the buyer's expected cost. Relaxing the assumption 
of symmetrical information could lead to results that can be used when not all cost and 
distribution information is known to the buyer. 
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